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DIMINISHED CAPACITY: ITS POTENTIAL
EFFECT IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades there has been concern within the legal
profession about the adequacy and utility of the traditional M'Naughton
rule as a test for criminal insanity. Prior to this time, the so-called "right-
wrong" test as a defense in criminal actions was commonly accepted. Re-
cent advances in modern psychiatry, however, suggest that the M'Naughton
test is unfair to the defendant. Consequently there has been a re-examination
of the problem of defining insanity in terms acceptable to both law and
psychiatry. Beginning with the adoption of the Durham rule' in the District
of Columbia in 1954, and with the publication of the Model Penal Code's
formulation of the defense in 1955,2 jurisdiction after jurisdiction has in-
novated tests or modified the traditional test through legislation, or by
court decision with the result that the Model definition, or some variant of
it, has been adopted by a substantial number of states and federal circuits.3
In response to the growing concern for a better test of criminal responsi-
bility, the California Supreme Court has also attempted to provide a more
practicable standard, in light of modern medicine, without entirely replacing
the old test. The California procedure modifies the M'Naughton rule by
providing the additional requirement that the defendant have the ability to
understand and realize that his conduct is a violation of the rights of others.
4
1 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The rule
states that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or mental defect."
2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Mental Disease or
Defect Excluding Responsibility:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) . . . [T]he terms mental disease or defect to not include abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
3 Sherry, Penal Code Revision Project-Progress Report, 43 CAL. ST. B.J. 900, 916
(1968).
4 People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964). See
Sherry, supra note 3, at 917:
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct,
as a result of mental illness, disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to
know or understand what he was doing, or to know or understand that his conduct
was wrongful, or to control his actions . . . . [This] test . . . uses terminology
which incorporates the thrust of Wolff, retains the cognitional test of M'Naghten
(sic], but which acknowledges the importance of the effect of insanity or mental
illness upon volition....
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This variation falls short of recognizing the psychiatric theory "that mental
aberration may not only impair knowledge of wrongfulness but may very well
destroy an individual's capacity to control or to restrain himself."5
It is significant that the net result has been the creation of a new concept,
commonly referred to as diminished responsibility, but which is more ac-
curately called diminished capacity because it relates to the person's mental
capacity to commit a crime as distinguished from his responsibility. 6 Gen-
erally, the defense of diminished capacity may be asserted in those cases
where a specific mental state is an essential element of the crime, and this
may be substantiated by the introduction of medical and related testimony.
The defendant must be permitted to raise all reasonable doubts concerning
every element of the crime with which he is charged, and if one of those ele-
ments happens to be a specific mental state, evidence of intoxication or mental
defect or disease must be admitted. The effect has been to make the appli-
cation of the rule of diminished capacity a fact finding process at the guilt
phase of the trial.7
The purpose and effect of the defense is to ameliorate the law governing
the old test by providing that even if the defendant is legally sane according
to the M'Naughton rule, if he is suffering from some defect that prevented his
acting with a specific mental state, he cannot be convicted of a crime which
requires such an element.8 In light of the above discussion, it can no longer
be doubted that the defense of mental illness or intoxication, not amounting
to legal insanity under M'Naughton, is a significant issue in any case where
it is raised by substantial evidence.
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the current law concerning di-
minished capacity in California and to analyze its effectiveness and utility as
an adjunct to the traditional M'Naughton test of criminal insanity.
I
DEVELOPMENT
Two distinct classifications are encompassed within the doctrine of dimin-
ished capacity.9 The first concerns the problem of mental illness, and the
second concerns intoxication.
5 Sherry, supra note 3, at 916.
6 People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 364, 406 P.2d 43, 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 772
(1965).
7 People v. Moore, 257 Cal. App. 2d 740, 752, 65 Cal. Rptr. 450, 459 (1968).
See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1957) which provides for a bifurcated trial where
insanity is pleaded.
8 People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 319, 411 P.2d 911, 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,
820 (1966).
9 See generally Kay, Diminished Capacity, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 385 (1967) for a more




With respect to this classification, the landmark case is People v. Wells.10
There the defense was allowed to introduce testimony relating to the mental
condition of the defendant at the time of the alleged crime in order to negate
the specific intent element. The importance of such a ruling is clear because
during the guilt phase of the trial the burden is upon the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had such specific intent. Evi-
dence tending to rebut such a mental state becomes a significant mechanism
in raising a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.
While the court in Wells may be considered to have created the defense
of diminished capacity, it failed to establish any guidelines for assessing
the defendant's mental state. In People v. Wolff,"' however, the court de-
lineated some of the requisite elements to be used in the examination of the
defendant's mental condition. The essential factors concern the defendant's
"moral turpitude and depravity" as reflected by the extent to which he under-
stood the nature and quality of his act, the amount of reflection upon the
possible consequences of such an act and the realization of the enormity of
the contemplated evil. In Wolff, the court reduced the conviction of first
degree murder, of a fifteen year old who killed his mother, to second degree,
on the grounds that the defendant could not have "maturely and meaning-
fully" reflected upon the gravity of his contemplated act. The court rea-
soned that the requisite moral turpitude was not sufficient to sustain a first
degree murder conviction. The court explained that the true test is not the
duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Wolff thus
appears to institute an intelligent appreciation test for a first degree murder
conviction since the defendant must be shown to have reflected upon, com-
prehended and understood the contemplated act to a substantial extent.12
In a later case, People v. Steele,18 the concepts utilized in the Wolff case
seem modified by the suggestion that the defendant's reasoning process, with
respect to premeditation and deliberation of the crime, must be sound and
logical. In Steele, the defendant was found sane under the M'Naughton
rule, but reversal was ordered because the defense was not allowed to intro-
duce evidence of a mental condition which related to the defendant's ability
to premeditate and deliberate the crime.14
10 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
11 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
12 Id. at 820-21, 394 P.2d at 974-75, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 286-87. Accord People v. Cay-
lor, 259 Cal. App. 2d 191, 203, 66 Cal. Rptr. 448, 456 (1968).
13 237 Cal. App. 2d 182, 185, 46 Cal. Rptr. 704, 706 (1965).
In Steele, the court does not make it clear whether the defendant was unable to
reason in a sound and logical manner as a matter of law.
14 With respect to the mental defect and disease aspect of diminished capacity, a sum-
mary of decisions may be useful in showing what evidence may be utilized to meet
the standard set up in Wolff and Steele. These include: a sudden change in personality,
19701
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It is significant to note an evidentiary problem with respect to the
mental defect classification of diminished capacity. Since it is accepted that
a mental disease or defect, not amounting to legal insanity, may impair an
accused's ability to form a specific intent, all evidence tending to prove or
disprove the existence of the requisite mental state is admissible. The
problem arises as to the effect of conflicting evidence. When Justice Schauer,
in Wolff, makes reference to the defendant's undisputed mental illness,
is the court suggesting that a total lack of conflict as to mental condition
is the critical factor? While this argument is advanced by Justice Mosk,
dissenting in People v. Goedecke,15 it has not been accepted by later cases.
With the exception of one case, 16 which suggests that there is a need for some
expert testimony at the guilt phase of the trial to give rise to an instruction of
diminished capacity, it seems clear that evidence tending to reflect upon
the requisite mental state is admissible. Were this not the case, it would
place an inordinate burden upon the defense to prove the effect of the de-
fendant's mental condition.
B. Intoxication
People v. Gorshen17 is the landmark case connecting intoxication with
diminished capacity. The court held that evidence of voluntary intoxica-
tion coupled with mental illness was admissible to negate the requisite
mental state. In Gorshen, the evidence suggested that defendant's mental
condition was precipitated by his intoxication thereby precluding the mental
state required for first degree murder.
It was six years before the California Supreme Court was confronted with a
fact situation in which voluntary intoxication was the sole ground for the de-
fense of diminished capacity. In People v. Anderson,'8 the court predicated
the finding of defendant's diminished capacity upon the unconsciousness pro-
duced by voluntary intoxication, despite the defense's allegation that the de-
fendant might have had an epileptic seizure at the time he murdered a ten
year old girl. 19  The court noted that voluntary intoxication does not en-
tirely relieve the 'defendant of responsibility. Rather it may establish that
People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 423 P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1967); evidence
of paranoia, People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), and People v.
Moore, 257 Cal. App. 2d 740, 65 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1968); and evidence showing the
crime to be utterly bizarre, as in People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal. 2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56
Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967). Under all these circumstances, the concept of diminished
capacity may be used to reduce the defendant's conviction, or in some situations pre-
clude responsibility for the crime.
15 65 Cal. 2d 850, 863, 423 P.2d 777, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625, 633 (1967).
16 People v. Glover, 257 Cal. App. 2d 502, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1967).
17 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
18 63 Cal. 2d 351, 406 P.2d 43, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1965).
19 Id. at 364, 406 P.2d at 51, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
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he did not have the requisite intent for the crime with which he is charged,
and therefore he may only have the crime reduced under the diminished
capacity defense.
20
Similarly, in People v. Conley,21 the court accepted the defense of di-
minished capacity, based solely upon unconsciousness produced by voluntary
intoxication, in situations involving specific intent crimes. In the decision,
the court also stressed that the defense would not be available when the
crime requires only a general intent.2 2 The Conley opinion suggests a type
of manslaughter which does not come within any of the three definitions
found in Penal Code Section 192.23 Thus in effect, Conley holds that
there are two general classifications of voluntary manslaughter: the type
prescribed in the Penal Code, and a second type which derives from the doc-
trine of diminished capacity. This latter type of voluntary manslaughter is a
homicide which may be intentional, voluntary, deliberate, premeditated and
unprovoked, but which differs from murder because the element of malice is
rebutted by a showing that the defendant's mental capacity was impaired by
intoxication.2 4 It should be recognized that while the court is willing to ac-
cept intoxication as a basis for diminished capacity, regardless of whether
the existence of any mental illness is demonstrated, 2 5 the court has not
allowed voluntary intoxication to be a complete defense. While uncon-
sciousness261 generally is a complete defense to a criminal charge, in the case
of voluntary intoxication it will not completely excuse a criminal homicide,
although it will allow a reduction to involuntary manslaughter.
27
To summarize, intoxication together with mental illness may be a basis
of diminished capacity.2 8  The courts have also suggested that voluntary
intoxication, standing alone, may be sufficient to rebut the element of specific
intent.29
20 Id. at 366, 406 P.2d at 53, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
21 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
22 Id. at 323, 411 P.2d at 919, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 823. See also People v. Hood, 1
Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969); People v. Seals, 1 Cal. 3d 574, 462
P.2d 993, 82 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1970). Seals was a per curiam opinion and relied on Hood.
23 CAL. PEN. CODE § 192 (West 1957). "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice. It is of three kinds: (1) voluntary-upon a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion, (2) involuntary. .. , (3) in the driving of a vehicle...."
See People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 385 n.1, 461 P.2d 659, 662 n.1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379,
382 n.1 (1969).
24 People v. Aubrey, 253 Cal. App. 2d 912, 919, 61 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776 (1967).
25 People v. Juarez, 258 Cal. App. 2d 349, 356, 65 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (1968).
206 Unconsciousness here refers to an inability to perceive rather than a lack of
mobility.
27 People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d -, -, 454 P.2d 686, 696, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790,
800 (1969). See also People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1969).
28 People v. Ford, 65 Cal. 2d 41, 416 P.2d 132, 52 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966). People
v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
29 See People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 406 P.2d 43, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1965),
19703
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II
CURRENT PROBLEMS
At present a mental illness defense offers greater likelihood of exonera-
tion or reduction in degree of the crime than does intoxication. It seems
unlikely that there will be a merger of the two classifications of mental
illness and intoxication given the court's recent pronouncements that vol-
untary intoxication is never a complete defense to a specific intent crime.8 0
Since other areas presently encompassed within the category of voluntary in-
toxication (drug addiction, chronic alcoholism, and the dependent use of cer-
tain hallucinogens) are more akin to mental disease, they should be treated
similarly under the doctrine of diminished capacity. In such case, it
seems that the general policy considerations which militate in favor of
limiting the exculpatory effect of voluntary intoxication are not applicable,
since these conditions can more logically be considered a form of disease as
opposed to mere intoxication.
California does not recognize such a distinction. In People v. Wilson,8'
the court stated that the law prohibits only the punishment of an individual
for incurring and suffering a particular chronic condition or illness, and
does not offer immunity from criminal prosecution or conviction where that
condition is separate from the criminal conduct.3 2  The court reached this
result because the problem is contemplated in terms of criminal responsi-
bility as distinguished from criminal capacity. Note, however, that the
concept of diminished capacity relates to the individual's ability to form
the criminal intent, and not his responsibility for the act. The real prob-
lem, therefore, is not the question of whether the individual may be pun-
ished for his conduct. Rather, it is whether he was acting volitionally,
unaffected by any disease or condition which might hinder his ability
to control his behavior. Since mens rea is the sine qua non of criminality,
should not the diminished capacity doctrine be applied to general intent
crimes in all cases where a jury finds a disease eliminates the volitional
nature of the act of voluntary intoxication?
An analysis of the policy reasons for not allowing voluntary intoxication
to be a complete defense tends to support the position that addiction, alco-
holism, and other diseased conditions should be distinguished from mere vol-
untary intoxication. In essence, the rationale used to justify this limitation
and People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966) (un-
consciousness produced by intoxication); People v. Aubrey, 253 Cal. App. 2d 912, 61
Cal. Rptr. 772 (1967) (acute drunkenness as a defense to a specific intent crime).
30 People v. Wilson, 261 Cal. App. 2d 12, 67 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1968).
31 Id.
82 Id. at 17, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 681 (1968).
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is twofold. First, it would appear that our society has morally condemned
intoxication, whether induced by alcohol or drugs. It is not surprising to
find cases where the courts declare that the vice of voluntary intoxication
cannot be used as a shelter against the legal consequences of the defendant's
act,38 for to do otherwise would encourage anarchy.3 4
A second related basis of limitation is found in the deterrent aspect of
criminal sanctions. The deterrent concept may be said to embrace the idea
that if a person willingly takes liquor or drugs, knowing of their intoxicating
effect, or assuming the risk of that possibility, he may not escape the ultimate
legal consequences which predictably flow from such intoxication. This is
a risk controlling mechanism, which is valid with respect to most types
of intoxication, but should not be applicable in situations where it can
be shown that the intoxicated condition is produced without a willing or
knowing use, or without the willing assumption of such a risk.3 5 Essentially,
this is the law in California with respect to involuntary intoxication. 6
In theory, there is no logical reason for not allowing diminished capacity
to be a complete defense to a specific intent crime. It has been suggested that
"if the theory is sound at all . . . [it should logically extend] to all crimes
requiring a specific intent or even general intent, including negligent crimes."1
37
If the doctrine were extended to embrace this position, the effect would be
to supplant the M'Naughton rule by the use of the diminished capacity con-
cept at the guilt phase of the trial. The test of criminal capacity would then
be whether the defendant, at the time he committed the crime, was suffering
from a disease which prevented his formulation of a mens rea.
Presently, however, the doctrine operates only to reduce a specific intent
crime to a lesser included crime. Guided by policy considerations, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in People v. Hood,38 was unwilling to extend the
application of the doctrine to general intent crimes. The court's rationale
stemmed from an historical distinction between specific and general intent.3 9
33 See People v. Townsend, 269 Cal. App. 2d 430, 432 n.1, 74 Cal. Rptr. 758, 760 n.1
(1969); People v. Morrow, 268 Cal. App. 2d 939, 948, 74 Cal. Rptr. 551, 558 (1969).
34 People v. Morrow, 268 Cal. App. 2d 939, 953, 74 Cal. Rptr. 551, 561 (1969).
35 See CAL. JURY INsnTucToNs ClHMINAL No. 78-D (Revised) (West Supp. 1967).
36 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 26 (6) (West 1957); see also CAL. JuRy INSTRucTIONS
CRimiNAL No. 78-E (Revised) (West Supp. 1967).
37 People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal. App. 2d 901, 914, 61 Cal. Rptr. 37, 45 (1967), quoting
from GurrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHATRY AND Ta LAw 431-32 (1952).
38 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
39 Note the court's distinction between general and specific intent:
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act,
without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence,
we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention
is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's
intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime
is deemed to be one of specific intent. There is no real difference, however, only
a linquistic one, between an intent to do an act already performed and an intent
to do that same act in the future.
Id. at 456-57, 462 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
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Apparently, this distinction evolved as a judicial response to the problem
of voluntary intoxication. 40 It is an attempt to reconcile two competing con-
siderations involved in the treatment of persons who commit crimes while
intoxicated. The idea is to treat these persons as being less culpable
than sober persons who commit the same crime, without exculpating
them entirely. By limiting the exculpatory effect of voluntary intoxication
the law attempts to deter risk creating behavior.
Is this policy applicable when voluntary intoxication is not the basis of a
criminal defense? The Hood case indicates the rationale for not allowing
voluntary intoxication to constitute a defense to general intent crimes. The
court, however, does not suggest any policy which would limit the defense
of mental disease in general intent crimes. If the policy grounds for dis-
tinguishing between general and specific intent are predicated on voluntary
intoxication, it could be argued that this policy is inapplicable when voluntary
intoxication is not involved. Seemingly, the courts could accept mental
disease as a complete defense under the doctrine of diminished capacity.
Or, the courts could at least accept this position if the mental disease pro-
duces a state of unconsciousness since unconsciousness is generally a complete
defense under California law.41
When viewed in this perspective it is questionable whether the Hood
rationale should have any efficacy when applied to drug addiction, chronic
alcoholism or the use of certain hallucinogens, if such conditions may be
deemed to be the result of involuntary intoxication or disease. In all three
cases, it is probable that the volitional element has been eroded by the
person's diseased status, and therefore any policy not allowing diminished
capacity to be a complete defense is ill-founded. In light of the California
doctrine that mental disease affects criminal capacity, can there be any
reasonable basis for not allowing it, or other diseases which affect volition
to be considered a complete defense?
We shall now focus upon this question in three specific areas: drug ad-
diction, chronic alcoholism and the use of hallucinogens, and suggest that
these could be complete defenses in future cases.
A. Drug addiction
Although legal distinctions are not generally made between a narcotic-in-
duced state, and an alcohol-induced state,42 it would seem the two must be
40 Id. at 455, 462 P.2d at 377, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
41 People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d -, -, 454 P.2d 686, 696, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790, 800
(1969).
42 Under California law, the intoxication which may negate specific intent need not
be induced by alcohol. CAL. PEN. CODE § 22 (West 1957). In fact, intoxication re-
sulting from drugs (LSD in this case) has the same legal effect as intoxication induced
by alcohol. People v. Fanning, 265 Cal. App. 2d 729, 71 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1968). See
also People v. Butler, 205 Cal. App. 2d 437, 23 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1962).
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distinguished in light of Robinson v. California43 and Powell v. Texas.44
While Robinson dealt with the question of status, 45 as opposed to conduct,
it seems that the nature of that status (drug addiction) creates such a con-
dition of dependency that the continued use of the drug is no longer volitional.
Therefore the Robinson logic can be used to support the theory that drug
addiction could be a complete defense under the doctrine of diminished
capacity. When an individual has become an addict, is he not an involun-
tary user, regardless of the fact that his addiction resulted from voluntary use
of the drug in the first place? If so, an accused's diseased status could be con-
sidered an intervening factor which would negate the volitional requirement
inherent in the concept of voluntary intoxication.
The President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse sum-
marized the diseased nature of drug addiction in its final report:
All [narcotic drugs] profoundly affect the central nervous system and the mind.
The effects produced by taking these drugs are primarily on the brain and range
from euphoria through excitement to depression. . . Many bring about a deep
feeling that everything in life must be made to serve the purpose of maintaining
a supply of the drug. These drugs are psychotoxic (mind poisoning). A psycho-
toxic drug is any chemical substance capable of adducing mental effect which leads
to abnormal behavior. They affect or alter, to a substantive extent, consciousness,
the ability to think, critical judgment, motivation, psychomotor co-ordination, or
sensory perception. 46
Assuming that the current policy in California with respect to voluntary
intoxication is proper so long as the volitional element is present, if that
element is negated by a status disease, such as drug addiction, the individual
should not be denied the doctrine of diminished capacity as a potentially
complete defense. To do otherwise could deprive the individual of equal pro-
tection if mental disease is allowed to become a complete defense under the
doctrine of diminished capacity, and subject him to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the Eighth Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment concepts.
If a state allows one disease to be a complete defense under the doctrine, equal
protection should require the same result with respect to other diseases, such
as drug addiction, which have the same effect on volition. This seems
especially true where a particular diseased status is protected against criminal
punishment by the Eighth Amendment. In light of Robinson, if the status
of a narcotic addict cannot be punished, criminal sanction for his use of the
43 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Court held that drug addiction, in itself, is a sickness,
and cannot be punished by law.
44 392 U.S. 514 (1968). The Court held that chronic alcoholism was not a defense
to a Texas public drunkenness statute which provided:
Whoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public
place... shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.
VmuoN's ANN. TEx. PEN. CODE art. 477 (1952).
45 Important distinctions were made between "status", "condition" and "act". See
generally Note, 2 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 159 (1969).
46 UNrTED STATES PREsmENT ADvisoRy CoMMIssIoN ON NARconc AND DRUG ABUSE,
FINAL REPORT at 1 (1963).
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drug should also reflect that consideration, since such use is a product of the
status. California does not seem to have adopted this position47 because
the courts have viewed the problem in terms of criminal responsibility rather
than criminal capacity.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with the problem of addictive
status and conduct in a similar manner. In Powell v. Texas,48 the Court
differentiated between the particular status disease and subsequent acts of
the individual. The Court held that while status cannot be punished, the
acts produced while under the influence of the intoxicant (in this case alcohol)
should not be exempt from criminal sanction. In a 5-4 opinion (White, J.,
concurring in the result), Justice Marshall suggested that the problem of alco-
holism was still too vague and uncertain to be used as a defense.49 The
majority of the Court was hesitant to recognize a constitutional requirement
that chronic alcoholism was protected from prosecution under the Eighth
Amendment. It was also stressed that there was not a universally accepted
definition of alcoholism as a disease, and therefore the Court could not force
the states to accept an irresistible impulse rule as a matter of constitutional
law.50 Implicit in this reasoning is the concept that once a status is universally
accepted by medical authorities as a disease (and the characteristics of that
disease are capable of determination with precision by medical proof), a con-
trary decision may be reached. This suggests that status cannot be punished
directly and the defendant should not be punished indirectly by refusing
to allow the disease as a defense under the doctrine of diminished capacity.
Ultimately this approach would allow the law to treat drug addiction in
much the same way it does mental disease. Even if narcotic addiction is
judicially accepted as a complete defense, it would not necessarily preclude
criminal responsibility for the proscribed conduct. The jury must still be
convinced that the defendant was in fact an addict and because of the
disease he could not have the requisite volitional intent to become intoxicated.
In order to apply this functional test, one would still need to produce evi-
dence relating to a particular defendant, the nature of the drug, its propensi-
ties, and the defendant's particular stage or degree of addiction when he com-
mitted the crime. This approach would place drug addiction in the same
relation to diminished capacity as mental disease, a result consistent with
the medical realities of addiction, and the present policy in California
with respect to voluntary intoxication.
Dictum in a recent California case, People v. Mahle,51 implies that if evi-
dence shows compulsive intoxication induced by liquor or drugs, it perhaps
47 People v. Wilson, 261 Cal. App. 2d 12, 67 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1968). To date the
California Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this problem.
48 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 People v. Mahle, 273 Cal. App. 2d -, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365 (1969).
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should give rise to an instruction on involuntary intoxication. This is
consonant with the argument developed in this discussion.
B. Chronic alcoholism
While alcoholism and drug addiction are not identical in nature, they are
analogous when considered in terms of status. The basic question, therefore,
is whether a chronic alcoholic should be acquitted of a crime requiring
intent, if he was suffering from that disease, his intoxication was a product of
it and prevented the formation of the requisite intent. If so, should not the
ultimate outcome be treatment and not punishment?
In Powell v. Texas,52 however, a divided court refused to accept alcoholism
as a "legal disease" despite significant medical evidence and case law5" which
suggested that an alcoholic is an addict, an involuntary drinker, who drinks be-
cause of a compulsion symptomatic of the disease. Notwithstanding the
quantum of medical evidence available, the majority of the Court was con-
cerned with the diversity of expert opinion, which the Court felt reflected
a sharp division within the medical profession about the definition and nature
of alcoholism. As previously mentioned, were the Court to determine as
a matter of constitutional law that alcoholism constituted a disease, the re-
sult would be to force an irresistible impulse rule upon the states. The added
factor of conflicting medical opinion weighed heavily against such a deter-
mination.
Assuming no clear definition of alcoholism exists, or there is no complete
agreement as to its causes, is this a reasonable ground for denying the disease
status? The same might also be asked of cancer or mental disease. The point
is not whether the medical profession has framed an exact definition; rather,
the question is whether the approach should be functional. If the medical
profession, or a substantial part of it, views alcoholism as a disease, then it
should be accepted as a "legal disease".54
Since there has been a growing acceptance of alcoholism as a disease in the
last two decades, why does the law still treat it as a form of moral transgres-
sion? Alcoholism is treated as immoral conduct even though its addictive
nature is recognized by both the medical profession55 and some courts.56 In
addition, forty-two states have enacted legislation recognizing the problem of
alcoholism as an illness, and which provide for the establishment of treatment
facilities.5
7
52 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
53 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); Easter v. District of Colum-
bia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
54 See generally Kirbens, Chronic Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Responsibility,
54 A.B.AJ. 877 (1968).
55 T. PLAuT, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS, A REPORT TO THE NATION at 39 (1967).
56 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); Easter v. District of Columbia,
361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
57 Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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If alcoholism is a disease-and the judiciary and legislatures have lent
credence thereto-it is more properly a subject of medical attention than
criminal sanction. Powell does not necessarily affect this because only
four members of the Court refused to recognize alcoholism as a legal disease.
In addition, the reluctance of the Court to impose an irresistible impulse
rule upon the states should not be construed to mean that once a state has
recognized such a rule it may arbitrarily decide which diseases it will consider
to be within that rule. Also, if a state recognizes a diminished capacity
defense, and accepts mental disease to be a complete defense under that
doctrine, should it not allow other diseases having the same effect on volition
to be a complete defense? To do otherwise might result in an arbitrary
classification, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause.
Finally, assuming judicial acceptance of alcoholism as a legal disease, it
would not necessarily follow that automatic acquittal would result. As in the
case of drug addiction or other diseased status, the defense must establish
prima facie that the defendant was an alcoholic, that he could not have exer-
cised the volitional control requisite to a finding of voluntary intoxication, and
that this intoxication prevented the formation of the requisite criminal intent.
C. Hallucinogenic drugs
In general the term hallucinogens refers to drugs, which, when consumed,
manifest their presence through the creation of mental impressions.5 8 The
taking of these drugs can produce a variety of intense and unusual psychic
effects.5 9 The effects may range from a loss of time and space perception
with mild apprehension, to panic, severe anger, elation and deep depression.00
One accusation levelled at the drugs is that they may precipitate mental
illness. In fact, it has been suggested that all hallucinogens appear to be
capable of creating psychotic conditions.6' It shoud be noted, however, that
there is a plethora of psychiatric evidence-and even that is characterized by
disagreement--on the nature of the effect created by hallucinogens. Nor
does the medical evidence either conclusively prove or disprove any of the
theories related to the "cultogenic phenomenon" herein mentioned.
It is commonly asserted that hallucinogens are not addictive. The hallu-
cinogen user is generally distinguished from the narcotic addict on the ground
that the hallucinogen user remains capable of self-control, and thus he is not
so ill as to require rehabilitation or punishment. Since physical addiction is
58 WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY at 1023 (3d ed. 1961).
59 Cole & Katz, The Psychotomimetic Drugs, 187 A.M.A.J. 758 (1964).
60 Id. at 758.
61 Note, Hallucinogens, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 521, 536 (1968); see also Louria, Abuse
of LSD in LSD, MAN AND SOCIETY 37-39 (Debold & Leaf ed. 1967). The state which




not the only form of dependence on drugs, the psychological relationship be-
tween the narcotic addict and the drug would appear to be an important con-
sideration. While distinctions can be drawn between the narcotic addict and
the user of hallucinogens, some psychological dependence may follow from the
use of the hallucinogens, since the user's social life may be centered around the
drug to such an extent that "normal" life is impossible.
62
The real danger involved in the use of these drugs relates to the psycho-
logical and social aspects. For a small but visible subculture using hallucino-
gens, the drugs can reinforce a retreat from traditional notions of "produc-
tivity", and cause a pattern of mood changes, personality disorders and a
general "dropping out-an effect perhaps more damaging to personality
organization than actual psychosis." 63
Because an individual may lose contact with reality while under the influ-
ence of hallucinogens, he must lean upon others for support. Hence, groups
and cults naturally tend to form in order to link the unique experience to
some kind of social reality. This so-called "cultogenic phenomenon" may
create highly structured religious groups or mystic communities, essentially
hostile to the existence of "law and order".
64
Regardless of the reason for the initial use of hallucinogens, it seems quite
probable, given current medical evidence, that there are certain psycho-
logically addictive qualities which result from the effect of the drugs. This
form of dependency could also be considered a form of status disease, within
the framework previously discussed with respect to narcotic addiction and
alcoholism. Furthermore, it is quite likely that with the use of some of these
drugs (e.g., LSD), problems will be presented where the drug creates a
particular mental condition (e.g., schizophrenia). In such cases, should a
drug-induced physiological or psychological change be treated in a manner
different from mental disease? Since the drug may have results far sur-
passing what the normal person would expect, it seems too severe to hold
him to the same standard of capacity as voluntary intoxication. Arguably,
when a person drinks, he can envision the legal consequences; the same can-
not be said of persons taking hallucinogens. It has been suggested that the
greater the legal responsibility, the less likely the person would be to use the
drug. This argument seems speculative because personality changes may
occur after the defendant can no longer be said to be in control of his ac-
tions.6 5
62 R. BLUM, UToPIATEs 285 (1964); Louria, supra note 61, at 41.
68 Freedman, A Psychiatrist Looks at LSD, 32 FED. PROB. 16, 18 (June 1968).
64 Note, Hallucinogens, supra note 61, at 559. See also Freedman, supra note 63.
65 This writer admits that a strong argument can be made for not making use of
hallucinogenic drugs a complete defense, especially with respect to the deterrent effect
which could be a significant factor in controlling the risks involved in the use
of unpredictable drugs. By placing the burden upon the potential user, the net
result may be that he will have second thoughts before he ever takes a drag for the
first time.
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As mentioned previously, there appears to be no reason that the psycho-
logically addictive nature of hallucinogens cannot be considered a form of
status disease. The user's dependence upon the "intoxicant" negates the voli-
tional element requisite to voluntary intoxication. Thus the jury should be
given the opportunity to examine all the medical evidence relating to the
defendant's status. Where this evidence does not support a finding of de-
pendency, the defendant would be treated as if he were voluntarily intoxi-
cated.
It is the purpose of the foregoing discussion, with respect to all three of
these status diseases, to suggest certain arguments to bring these within
the mental disease classification of diminished capacity, or at least to exempt
them from the voluntary intoxication classification, so they may be utilized as
a complete defense. Granting that not all medical evidence supports this
theory, it is necessary to bring the question before the jury so it may decide
after hearing all the evidence whether the individual had sufficient volition to
become voluntarily intoxicated. Unless these status diseases are accepted by
the trial courts as involuntary conditions, as a matter of law, this question will
never be presented to a jury.
INSANITY VERSUS DIMINISHED CAPACITY
Assuming diminished capacity is accepted as a potentially complete de-
fense to a crime involving a mens rea, it is important to examine some of
the advantages of the defense vis-h-vis an insanity plea. The plea of dimin-
ished capacity may be of significance as a surprise, since no advance apprisal
need be given to the prosecution. Under California's bifurcated trial pro-
cedure,60 when an insanity plea is entered, the prosecution has access to
the reports of the court-appointed psychiatrists. 67 Thus the prosecution is in
a better position to examine the defendant's mental condition than in the
case where a diminished capacity plea is raised. The latter technique allows
the defense to await trial before disclosing evidence relating to the defendant's
mental condition. s
Also, under a diminished capacity plea, based upon mental illness, the
defendant may be found not guilty at the guilt phase of the trial. This is not
possible with an insanity plea since it relates to responsibility for the criminal
act, while a plea of diminished capacity relates to the elements of the crime
itself.
66 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1957).
67 Kay, supra note 9, at 386.
68 It is unfortunate that the element of surprise might serve as a tactical advantage,
but it is likely an inescapable conclusion that defense attorneys would regard it as such.
Possibly such a tactical advantage should be eliminated.
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COMMENTS
Finally, the diminished capacity defense allows the defendant the oppor-
tunity to avoid the inadequacies of the M'Naughton rule. For years this rule
has been criticized on the ground that it wrongly assumes the mind can be
broken down into compartments, one sane, and the other insane.6 9 The
defect is that the rule fails to take into account the total mental condition of
the defendant at the time he committed the crime. Likewise, the rule does
not provide the jury with an adequate standard with which to judge the
defendant's total personality. Diminished capacity offers a more practicable
alternative since the courts consider it to be a fact finding process. The
defense would therefore be able to introduce all relevant evidence in order to
demonstrate that the defendant's mental capacity was so diminished that no
mens rea existed, and thus the defendant could be found not guilty.
The problem arises as to what protective measures should be taken to
prevent the release of a person in such a situation, since he may be dangerous
to society because of his mental condition. With respect to this problem, the
Penal Code revisors offer some practical alternatives." They propose to
give the trial court authority to direct an evaluation of the defendant's con-
dition, as provided in the case of civil commitments under the California
Mental Health Act of 1967.71 In those cases in which a defendant is found
not guilty as a result of his defense of mental disease, he may be released if
the court is satisfied that he has recovered and is no longer dangerous to
others. On the other hand, this would permit commitment to an appropriate
state institution if it was found necessary. Similarly, it includes procedures
with respect to local custodial care and probationary supervision. Finally,
the court is given broad interlocutory power to permit release under super-
vision, to require further inquiry and evaluation of the person so released, and
if necessary, to require commitment to the Department of Mental Hygiene in
order to protect the public. In such a case, procedural safeguards are ac-
corded the defendant based upon existing statutory provisions and appropriate
due process protection.72 The ultimate effect of these procedures would
be to allow the defendant to avoid some of the inherent problems with the
M'Naughton rule, and yet protect society if his mental condition is found to
be dangerous.
Assuming these procedures are adopted, an individual who is contem-
plating the defense of diminished capacity should recognize that he ulti-
mately may risk commitment for a longer period than he would if found
guilty of the crime. For example, it is possible that a defendant may
be found guilty of a felony and still be released from prison in less than
five years. If he chooses the diminished capacity defense and is acquitted,
69 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961).
70 Sherry, supra note 3, at 918.
71 See Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WEr.i. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-401 (West
Supp. 1970). The specific grant of authority is contained in § 5200.
72 Sherry, supra note 3, at 918.
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the court may find him to be a danger to society and commit him for an
indefinite period. Thus the defense would not always be as useful as
it would appear in theory. The defendant would be faced with two con-
flicting choices. He could choose the defense and if acquitted risk indefinite
commitment. Or he may decide to plead guilty in order to obtain the
certainty offered by a prison sentence. The question is whether this de-
cision should be left to the lawyer and client, especially where the client
is mentally ill.
It may be suggested that the California Supreme Court has come close
to creating a legal standard compatible with modern psychiatric theories.
One author73 has posited that this "may have started a change in criminal
procedure wherein the trial of a major crime becomes a psychiatric sym-
posium." The recent case involving Sirhan B. Sirhan illustrates this hypothe-
sis. There the court was a forum for defense and prosecution psychiatrists
propounding different views regarding defendant's mental condition. While
this tends to confuse the jury, it seems more equitable with respect to the
defendant because it allows all the evidence to be presented.
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that since the jury is comprised of
laymen, the question arises as to whether jurors should be subjected to such
a bombardment of diverse medical evidence. Are they capable of consum-
ing such a quantum of technical testimony? This indicates the basic need
for greater legislative reform of the traditional tests for criminal responsibility
and criminal capacity. Once large amounts of highly technical evidence are
allowed to be submitted to a jury is this not an admission that the problem is
really medical and not legal? Perhaps the answer lies in the institution of psy-
chiatric forums, wherein the jury is comprised of medical experts who are
better able to comprehend the significance of psychological data. Until
a better system is devised, however, the judicially created defense of dimin-
ished capacity at least offers some practical alternatives otherwise denied by a
rigid adherence to the M'Naughton rule.
Charles Robert Leib
73 Kay, supra note 9, at 392.
